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Funding approaches for mental
health services: is there still a role
for clustering?
Rowena Jacobs, Martin Chalkley, María José Aragón, Jan R. Böhnke, Michael Clark
& Valerie Moran
SUMMARY
Funding for mental health services in England
faces many challenges, including operating
under financial constraints where it is not easy to
demonstrate the link between activity and funding.
Mental health services need to operate alongside
and collaborate with acute physical hospital
services, where there is a well-established system
for paying for activity. The funding landscape is
shifting at a rapid pace and we outline the dis-
tinctions between the three main options – block
contracts, episodic payment and capitation.
Classification of treatment episodes via clustering
presents an opportunity to demonstrate activity
and reward it within these payment approaches.
We discuss the results of our research into how
well the clustering system is performing against a
number of fundamental criteria. We find that,
according to these criteria, clusters are falling
short of providing a sound basis for measuring
and financing services. Nevertheless, we argue
that clustering is the best available option and is
essential for a more transparent funding approach
for mental healthcare to demonstrate its claim on
resources, and that clusters should therefore be
a starting point for evolving a better funding system.
LEARNING OBJECTIVES
• Understand the different payment models cur-
rently being used and proposed in mental
health services in England
• Understand the role of clustering in measuring
mental health activity and providing a basis for
funding
• Understand how a robust model of clustering
can benefit the provision of mental health
services
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In 2014, one of us (Jacobs 2014) wrote an article for
BJPsych Advances which explained a new method
of funding that was being rolled out in England’s
National Health Service (NHS) for mental health
service providers. This approach, then termed
payment by results (PbR), was to represent a funda-
mental change to the way providers of psychiatric
services are paid for the care of patients.
Now, 4 years on, it is opportune to take stock of
how things have developed, provide an update on
how the sector has responded to the proposed
funding approaches and reﬂect on what the
funding landscape means for clinicians and services.
A key development since 2014 has been the
proposal of not one, but two new payment
approaches to replace block contracts for mental
health services in England (NHS Improvement
2016). The ﬁrst approach, formerly termed PbR
and now referred to as the National Tariff
Payment System (NTPS), is an episodic payment
model. Under this approach, a provider is paid a
ﬁxed price or tariff for the care provided to a
patient during an agreed time frame or episode.
The tariff is speciﬁc to the mental health needs of
the patient and a mental health clustering tool
(MHCT) was developed to categorise these relative
needs (Self 2008). Twenty clusters have been devel-
oped as part of the classiﬁcation system and the cost
of treating patients in different clusters is recorded
by service providers. The data collected are used
to calculate national or local average costs for
patient care in each cluster. The ultimate goal of
this funding approach is the creation of a ﬁxed
price for each care cluster that could then be used
to pay services and may help to support cost control.
The second proposed payment approach, termed
the capitated payment model, is where a provider
is paid to cover a range of care for a whole popula-
tion. The provider is paid on the basis of the
number of people in the relevant population and
the payments are risk-adjusted to reﬂect the com-
plexity and needs of people with mental illness in
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that population. Mental health activity data are
crucial to identifying the mental health population
that may need care (NHS England 2016a), and
adjusting payment for the population’s needs and
the proportion of patients within each cluster could
serve as one of the mechanisms for risk adjustment,
although other approaches are possible, along with
other factors, such as age and gender proportions
within the population.
But what are the advantages and disadvantages of
the two payment approaches? How do quality and
outcomes indicators ﬁt into either of the payment
systems? Have mental health services introduced
either approach? And where does this leave the col-
lection of care cluster data by clinical teams?
In summary, there is a classiﬁcation or clustering
system that was originally developed with a view to
using it as a basis for payment, and there is a new
suggested approach to payment being developed
that seems to not require clustering at all. In the
rest of this article we attempt to unravel this
paradox and answer two fundamental questions.
Does the present clustering system fulﬁl its
purpose? Does clustering still matter? We start by
providing some more details of the two payment
systems, how they are supposed to work, how they
link to quality and outcomes and what they
require to operate.We then set out the role that clus-
tering can play and summarise what we have found
regarding whether the current clustering system is ﬁt
for purpose.
Two payment approaches for mental health
services
At present, NHS mental health services in England
are primarily funded through block contracts
agreed between commissioners and providers of
care. A block contract is a payment made to a pro-
vider to deliver a broadly deﬁned service: for
example, a hospital could be given a block contract
to provide mental health services in a particular geo-
graphical area. Under block contracts an agreed
ﬁxed sum is paid regardless of the number of
patients treated. Among the perceived problems
with this method of ﬁnancing is that it encourages
hospitals neither to control costs nor to increase
output (activity levels) (Mason 2011).
Although there are certain advantages to block con-
tracts (they require little in the way of data and mon-
itoring costs are low, they are easy to contract for and
provide stable funding since they are usually based on
historical funding patterns), there are clear disadvan-
tages (they are not transparent and it is unclear what
value for money is being obtained for a given level of
expenditure). The two new payment approaches
seek to overcome these disadvantages.
Episodic payment approach
The predominant mode of paying for acute physical
healthcare in England remains the episodic payment
approach, in which healthcare resource groups
(HRGs) – standard groupings of clinically similar
treatments that use common levels of healthcare
resource – represent units of activity or episodes of
care, for which a ﬁxed price or national tariff is set.
There are over 1400 mandatory tariffs, representing
around 60% of payments made to hospitals in
England (British Medical Association 2017a) and
this approach is the dominant form of payment in
most high-income countries.
Previous articles in this journal (Fairbairn 2007;
Oyebode 2007; Bhaumik 2011; Jacobs 2014;
Yeomans 2014) have highlighted the potential
advantages and disadvantages of introducing this
form of payment system to mental healthcare, and
these are outlined in Box 1.
The dominance of this funding approach in phys-
ical healthcare is, however, diminishing as it is
increasingly being seen as unsustainable. NHS
England and NHS Improvement now seek to ﬁnd
new ways to pay providers to support implementa-
tion of new models of care proposed in the Five
Year Forward View (Mental Health Taskforce
2016; Naylor 2017).
One of the key reasons for the shift away from the
tariff payment approach for acute physical care is
that the focus on speciﬁc procedures can lead to frag-
mented care and does not facilitate a coordinated
approach to healthcare delivery across sectors.
This can discourage the treatment of patients in
out-of-hospital settings. It is therefore seen as a
BOX 1 Advantages and disadvantages of an
episodic payment approach
Advantages
• Incentive to control unit costs and improve efficiency
• Incentive to increase activity levels and potentially
reduce waiting times
• Transparent funding approach for commissioners
• Can support patient choice
Disadvantages
• Providers may ‘cherry pick’ low-risk patients and ‘dump’
high-risk patients (Ellis 1998)
• Under-provision in order to minimise costs (e.g. skimping
on quality and intensity of treatment) (Ellis 1998)
• Upcoding of severity of patients’ illness to categories
with higher remuneration
• Requires good-quality data and coding
• Does not incentivise integration of care or services
Jacobs et al
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major barrier to the development of integrated care
(British Medical Association 2017a), which is a
key plank of current policy.
Sustainability and transformation partnerships
(STPs) are now the main mechanism for delivering
the Forward View and are seen as a vehicle for devel-
oping more integrated approaches between mental
and physical healthcare. In STPs, NHS organisa-
tions and local authorities in different parts of
England come together to develop 5-year ‘place-
based’ plans for health and social care services in
their area. There are 44 STP areas, each covering
an average population of 1.2 million people
(King’s Fund 2017).
Some of themore advanced STPs are now evolving
to become accountable care systems (ACSs) and these
havemore recently been rebranded as integrated care
systems (ICSs) (NHS England 2018). These systems
have no statutory basis, but are areas in which com-
missioners and providers, in partnership with local
authorities, are willing to work together to take expli-
cit collective responsibility for resources and popula-
tion health. These systems effectively dissolve the
boundaries between commissioners and providers.
ICSs should in principle have greater freedom and
control over the operation of their local health
system and how funding is deployed. There are cur-
rently ten ICSs that are working out the ﬁnancial,
contracting and risk-sharing arrangements to make
these systems sustainable (King’s Fund 2018).
A proposed further development is accountable
care organisations (ACOs), which are a more formal
version of an ICS that supposedly simpliﬁes contract-
ingbybringing together fundingstreamsandallowing
commissioners to hold a single contract with a single
provider, who takes responsibility for deciding how
to allocate resources and design care for the local
population (British Medical Association 2017b).
This can include primary care, hospital care and com-
munity care. Providers within an ACO can share any
‘savings’ to the public budget that are achieved
(Pollock 2018). Most parts of the country may
become ICSs before considering whether to introduce
ACOs, which as yet do not exist and are the subject of
legal challenges (Dyer 2018). These challenges are on
the basis that ACO decisions will be taken by non-
statutory bodies that may lack public accountability.
They will subsume some of the functions of clinical
commissioning groups (CCGs) and legislation will be
needed for ACOs to replace CCGs. All STPs should
become ACSs over the next few years, but it will
take considerably longer before ACSs formally
become ACOs (Moberly 2017), if at all.
It was the reduced incentive to integrate care
under the episodic payment approach, together
with the increased ability to foster integration
under these new organisational arrangements, that
led to the development of STPs (and ICSs and ultim-
ately ACOs) and acted as a major driver towards the
capitation payment approach, which is seen as a
means of contracting and paying for care within
these new geographic footprints.
Capitated payment approach
Capitation is a payment system whereby a lump-
sum payment based on the number of patients in a
target population is made to a provider or group of
providers, to provide some or all of their care
needs (British Medical Association 2017a). Like a
block contract, the capitation payment is not
linked to how many patients are treated.
Capitation is often seen as a means to integrate ser-
vices, particularly mental and physical healthcare,
where the provider is responsible for all the health
needs of mental health patients. For example, with-
inan STP local footprint, acute and mental health-
care providers will be jointly responsible for the
physical and mental health of their population. In
essence, capitation is a means of pricing a form of
‘block contract’, in that the population needs or
risks have to be deﬁned so that a per person price
can be deﬁned.
The potential advantages and disadvantages of a
capitation approach are very similar to those of a
block contract and are outlined in Box 2 (Monitor
2015).
Capitation may encourage greater investment in
preventive care and care delivered in community
settings, because it should give providers greater
ﬂexibility to spend money in the areas of a care
pathway where they believe it will deliver the best
outcomes for patients (British Medical Association
BOX 2 Advantages and disadvantages of a capitation payment approach
Advantages
• Incentive to invest in early intervention and
prevention to reduce ‘downstream’ costs
• More flexible allocation of resources to
improve efficiency
• Incentive to coordinate and integrate
health and social care services
Disadvantages
• Providers may ‘cherry pick’ low-risk
patients and ‘dump’ high-risk patients
(Ellis 1998)
• Under-provision in order to minimise costs
(e.g. skimping on quality and intensity of
treatment) (Ellis 1998)
• Requires good data to track activity, costs
and outcomes for individual patients
across different sectors
• Risk of cost shifting if service and popula-
tion scope are not clearly defined
• Requires significant capabilities on the pro-
vider side to coordinate different providers
and sectors (e.g. primary, secondary and
social care)
Funding approaches for mental health services
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2017a). However, there needs to be a clear mechan-
ism to take account of quality and risk as part of
capitated budgets. Arrangements for sharing of
risk and ﬁnancial gain/loss can be difﬁcult to agree
and operationalise in practice. The approach there-
fore demands high-quality data to (a) measure
quality and outcomes, both of which are notoriously
difﬁcult to agree and measure; and (b) develop risk-
adjustment mechanisms on demand levels to ensure
that the system can cope ﬁnancially.
Most STPs being developed and operationalised
in England aspire to move towards an outcome-
based capitated approach for their populations,
which would mean that clinicians would need to
document their outcomes, while payment would be
delivered on a per person basis to their provider
according to the overall needs of their population
and not the individual patient, but adjusted for
aggregate outcomes. How this payment approach
is to be implemented for mental healthcare within
these complex geographic footprints and care net-
works is as yet unclear. Ultimately, under an ACO,
the intention is that population-based capitation
payments will be derived from current CCG expend-
iture, although there will be signiﬁcant challenges in
deriving risk-adjusted capitation and risk-pooling
(Pollock 2018).
Linking quality and outcomes to payment
Under either of these payment approaches, linking
quality and outcome indicators to payment is a high
priority. This is because under either approach,
there is a real risk that providers will skimp on
quality. Either payment system therefore needs to be
linked tometrics of carequality andoutcomes for indi-
vidual patients (NHSEngland2016b).Guidance sug-
gests that a combination of both national and local
measures shouldbeused, ones that include bothphys-
ical and mental healthcare, and that reﬂect both clin-
ical and social outcomes (NHS England 2016b).
Other potential criteria include the need for waiting-
time standards to be included and for the co-produc-
tion of indicators with patients.
An example framework of potential quality and
outcome indicators as proposed by NHS England
is shown in Table 1. These cover a range of
quality and process as well as outcome measures.
Some are being routinely collected in services,
whereas others may be more challenging to collect.
Guidance suggests that a set of three to seven
outcome measures with between six and ﬁfteen indi-
cators should be used to link to payment at the con-
tract level (NHS England 2016c).
Our research (Moran 2015, 2017) shows that the
type of quality or outcome metric may matter in the
design of the payment system and its selection
should be based on sound evidence. The collection
and use of these performance indicators within a
payment framework may also have unintended con-
sequences`. Any approach will clearly require high-
quality and timely data to operate effectively.
There are currently a few examples in the mental
healthcare sector of where payment is attached to
outcomes, but not many where outcomes are
linked to clusters for payment purposes. Policy
makers are now considering ways to link speciﬁc
clusters, for example for psychosis, to evidence-
based care and set a best-practice tariff that is
linked to outcomes. One challenge is that much
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence
(NICE) guidance for mental health pre-dates the
use of care clusters and therefore does not simply
map onto them in terms of recommendations of
best practice.
Which approach to use? And what is happening
in reality?
Evidence suggests that, despite guidance (Monitor
2016) to the sector that it move away from block
contracts, very few providers/commissioners have
indeed done so. A handful of providers have
adopted the episodic payment approach, but capita-
tion approaches are currently seen as difﬁcult to
adopt since the data are not yet adequate to risk
adjust appropriately. Our research has shown that
the choice of payment options has in fact caused
much confusion among commissioners (Jacobs
2016) and they have felt uncertain as to which
approach to adopt and how to do it. Some felt they
ought to be developing capitation models to be
keeping up with the latest thinking. However, this
felt like a big step from their current practice of
using block contracts, because they were not able
to meet data requirements that would give them
adequate understanding of population risk in their
region and/or because it seemed that they would
be abandoning their work on episodic models,
which have a stronger evidence base, before they
had a chance to learn fully about this new approach
to commissioning.
Extrapolating from our understanding of the evi-
dence base about forms of payments and issues of
data quality, the notion of a capitation model as a
way forward seems to pose signiﬁcant challenges.
There is, however, little in the way of robust evi-
dence about the performance of capitation models
in the context of mental healthcare in England,
chieﬂy because they are new, although there are
some international examples (Monitor 2014).
Indeed, there is little evidence comparing a capita-
tion with an episodic payment system. This makes
it difﬁcult to determine the best model in terms of
Jacobs et al
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its overall cost-effectiveness and its utility as ameans
of managing fragmentation/integration risks.
We would argue that the episodic payment
approach has a number of advantages over the capi-
tated payment approach, including stronger incen-
tives to increase activity rates and control costs. It
may also be simpler to implement from a contracting
perspective and, given capacity constraints among
commissioners, may be more pragmatic since it
may be less prone to problems in terms of the
quality of partnerships or which organisations
within a local health economy are running a
deﬁcit. Episodic payment is a more transparent
funding approach than capitated payment. The epi-
sodic payment approach therefore has the potential
to establish greater parity of esteem between mental
and physical healthcare, although it is the case that
acute physical health services are slowly moving
away from episodic payment and this argument
may not hold in the future.
Two aspects are, however, common between the
two approaches and both are fundamental to the
operation of any payment model:
• the need for high-quality, timely data as part of a
classiﬁcation system that deﬁnes a measure of
activity – for example, a diagnosis or a cluster
• the need for valid and reliable measures of quality
and outcomes that can be linked to the classiﬁca-
tion system.
Although the use of diagnoses could be a valuable
addition to a classiﬁcation system, most countries
have found that diagnoses alone are not sufﬁcient
to identify need within a mental health payment
framework (Mason 2011).
TABLE 1 Examples of outcome and process measures in mental healthcare that NHS England suggests can be linked to
payment approaches
Domain Measure
Clinical effectiveness: clinician-reported
outcome measure (CROM)
Health of the Nation Outcome Scales (HoNOS)
Clinical effectiveness: patient-reported
outcome measure (PROM)
DIALOG
Short Warwick–Edinburgh Mental Well-Being Scale (SWEMWBS)
Patient experience: patient-reported
experience measure (PREM)
Friends and Family Test
Clinical effectiveness Emergency readmissions within 30 days
Clinical effectiveness (physical health) Premature mortality in adults with serious mental illness (SMI)
Smoking rate among patients with SMI
National Commissioning for Quality and Innovation (CQUIN) goal ‘Mental health and
physical wellbeing’
Patient experience PLACE (patient-led assessment of the care environment): condition, appearance,
maintenance
PLACE: privacy, dignity, well-being
Access Access to mental healthcare and waiting-time standards (e.g. data from improving access
to psychological therapies (IAPT) and early intervention in psychosis (EIP) services)
Access to cognitive–behavioural therapy for people with schizophrenia
Access to family interventions for people with schizophrenia
Black or Black British ethnic group proportion: % of population who identify their ethnicity
as Black or Black British
Efficiency Use of accident and emergency (A & E) departments by people in contact with mental
health services (e.g. ‘Emergency hospital admissions for intentional self-harm’
dataset)
People in contact with mental health services per 100 000 population
Bed occupancy rate
Proportion of admissions gate-kept by crisis resolution and home treatment teams
Help out of hours
Proportion of people on the care programme approach (CPA) with a crisis plan in place
Delayed transfers of care
Safety Age-standardised mortality rate from suicide
People on CPA followed up within 7 days of an in-patient discharge
NHS England patient safety notices
Source: after NHS England & NHS Improvement (2016b: p. 12).
Funding approaches for mental health services
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Why do we need clustering?
The episodic and capitated payment approaches
rely on a classiﬁcation system that effectively cate-
gorises patients’ symptoms and needs. However,
unless mental health activity is recorded and classi-
ﬁed in a way that provides strong evidence of what
funding achieves, it is at continuing risk of being
funded inadequately. Why? Because in any system
in which the ﬁnancial resources follow patients and
their needs, it is ultimately healthcare activity that
is used as the metric of need – and hence determines
funding. Mental health clusters therefore continue to
be an important tool both locally and nationally
(NHS Improvement 2016):
• in local pricing arrangements as a source of activ-
ity data, and
• in both capitated and episodic payment approaches.
Our research (Jacobs 2016) showed that commis-
sioners welcome the care cluster model and use it
as a framework to understand and discuss local pat-
terns of care and variations.
In both payment systems, clusters should be
essential to either (a) assign patients to resource-
homogeneous groups, or (b) deﬁne a unit of activity
for resource allocation. Clusters can help identify the
level of resources needed to treat different groups of
patients and therefore allow the provider to ‘claim’
resources according to the activity it performs.
Care clusters provide the basis for a classiﬁcation
system that makes mental health services more
transparent and accountable.
How is clustering working?
The key challenge for any payment approach is to
introduce a classiﬁcation system that accurately
and consistently captures similarities and differ-
ences between patients. The categories of such a
classiﬁcation system need to be homogeneous in
terms of both case-mix and resources, that is,
patients within a given care cluster have similar
needs proﬁles and their treatment requires approxi-
mately similar levels of resources. Our research
(Jacobs 2016) shows that there is enormous vari-
ation within the current clusters in terms of activity
and costs. Considerable variation in levels of need
and case-mix within care clusters was anticipated
from the outset (Bhaumik 2011; Jacobs 2014).
However, the problem with high levels of variation
within clusters is that accurate baseline activity
cannot be determined for commissioning purposes.
And high levels of cost variation within clusters
make it difﬁcult to set prices or tariffs.
We are concerned about not only absolute levels
of activity and costs, but also the relative variation
between providers in costs and activity rates. Our
research shows that the variation in activity rates
between providers is substantial. Variation in activ-
ity rates means that providers see different numbers
of patients, have different levels of productivity, and
put different care pathways and packages of care in
place for patients with similar levels of need. This
suggests differences in the quality of care that
patients receive across providers, generating poten-
tial geographic inequalities for patients. Variations
in costs mean that patients with similar levels of
need as deﬁned by the MHCT may be receiving dif-
ferent levels of resource, or again that there is
inequality between patients in what care they
receive because of where they live. The reduction
of variation in care, activity levels and costs is there-
fore pivotal to the establishment of a well-designed
classiﬁcation and payment system.
To examine these sources of variation, we did an
evaluation of whether the data collected in the
Mental Health Minimum Dataset (MHMDS) (now
called the Mental Health Services Dataset,
MHSDS) can provide accurate measures of activity
among mental health providers, and it showed sig-
niﬁcant variability also in activity and resource use
within clusters (Jacobs 2016). The measure of activ-
ity was the number of cluster days (the number of
days assigned to a cluster episode), while the
measure of resource use was (a) the number of
admitted (in-patient) days and (b) the number of
days with contact with a healthcare professional.
We used MHMDS data for the periods 2012–2013
and 2013–2014.
One of the issues identiﬁed (Jacobs 2016) was the
differences in the length of the cluster episodes
among providers. If all providers were delivering
the same care but were reporting it at different inter-
vals we would observe something like Fig. 1, where
longer cluster episodes have the same proportion
of resource use, in terms of both admitted days
and days with contact with a healthcare profes-
sional, as shorter episodes.
Figure 2 shows the actual length of cluster episodes
and activity and resource use for cluster 10
(ﬁrst episode of psychosis) as an example, using
MHMDS data. We see that longer cluster episodes
do not translate into proportionally more activity
(admitted days) and resource use (days with contact
with a healthcare professional), as anticipated. The
sources of this variation are not clear, some of it is
the result of data-quality problems, but this variation
also points to actual differences between providers, in
terms of practice and/or allocation to clusters.
We found very similar patterns of variation within
clusters and between providers for all 20 care clus-
ters (Jacobs 2016), i.e. there is substantial variabil-
ity across providers in the length of cluster
episodes (activity) and there is substantial
Jacobs et al
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variability within clusters in terms of the proportion
of admitted days and the proportion of contact with
healthcare professionals (resource use).
Authors have also drawn attention to the limita-
tions with respect to the costing of clusters, in par-
ticular a lack of homogeneity in costs for care
clusters (Bhaumik 2011; Jacobs 2014). Our research
(Jacobs 2016) also provides evidence of signiﬁcant
variation in cluster costs between providers: costs
reported by the most expensive provider are 55%
higher than average, whereas those of the least
expensive provider are 25% below average. The
ratio between the provider with the highest costs
and the one with lowest is around 2:1, but in some
clusters this ratio can be as high as 10:1. Looking
within clusters, those with large variability in costs
include clusters 1 (Common mental health problems
(low severity)), 2 (Commonmental health problems),
15 (Severe psychotic depression), 18 (Cognitive
impairment (low need)), 19 (Cognitive impairment
or dementia (moderate need)) and 21 (Cognitive
impairment or dementia (high physical need or
engagement)).
Do we abandon clustering? No!
Clusters are therefore not performing very well as a
classiﬁcation system to capture similarities and dif-
ferences between patients. The categories of the
current classiﬁcation system appear to be neither
case-mix nor resource homogeneous. We ﬁnd evi-
dence of large variation in terms of activity and
costs within clusters and between providers.
This would seem to suggest that it would be best
to dismantle the clustering approach altogether.
Indeed, there have been calls from many corners
expressing such views (Royal College of
Psychiatrists 2014). However, we would argue
that any payment approach needs to be underpinned
by a solid classiﬁcation system and to abandon the
clustering approach now will thwart all progress.
The clustering approach is already relatively well-
established among most providers. Scrapping it all
and starting from scratch risks putting mental
health services back a decade in terms of developing
a more transparent and fair funding system.
The key reason not to abandon clustering is that,
in the absence of such a classiﬁcation system, mental
health would be deprived of resources. Most CCGs
have contracts with acute physical healthcare provi-
ders in which they must pay according to the activity
performed, whereas providers of care in other set-
tings, such as community and mental healthcare,
are usually paid on the basis of block contracts. If
acute activity levels increase, CCGs must try to pay
for that increased activity, leaving, if their budgets
do not grow accordingly, fewer resources to allocate
among the other care settings. However, actual
behaviourmay diverge from the contractual position
if CCG budgets are insufﬁcient (Allen 2016).
The argument of the ‘institutional bias’ towards
acute providers in the funding system is well
rehearsed, often seeing larger cuts for mental
health services compared with acute services
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FIG 1 A hypothetical activity cluster. The x-axis represents each of the approximately 50
mental healthcare providers in the NHS, ordered by increasing size of their reported
number of cluster days for this particular hypothetical cluster. The measure of resource
use is (a) the number of admitted (in-patient) days and (b) the number of days with
contact with a healthcare professional (HPCON days).
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FIG 2 Activity in an actual cluster. The x-axis represents each of the approximately 50 mental
healthcare providers in the NHS, ordered by increasing size of their reported number of
cluster days for cluster 10 (first episode of psychosis). The measure of resource use is (a)
the number of admitted (in-patient) days and (b) the number of days with contact with a
healthcare professional (HPCON days).
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(King’s Fund 2015). Given the current and future
projected ﬁnancial position of providers, with
mental health providers generally delivering
overall surpluses year on year, compared with
huge increases in deﬁcits in recent years for acute
providers (Dunn 2016), mental health services
have been at risk of having their resources diverted
to acute providers. The lack of a transparent
funding system for mental healthcare is a major
risk factor. As long as there are parallel funding
systems operating, where in one, better-quality
activity data and a more transparent classiﬁcation
system (episodic payment) make the return on
investment of limited budgets more obvious, that
payment approach will always win out. Thus, as
long as mental healthcare operates a block contract
system and does not use a transparent classiﬁcation
system, commissioners will not have a clear sense of
the value for money they are getting from investment
in these services. Even if both acute and mental
healthcare providers move towards a capitation
approach under an STP, the argument for a strong
and transparent classiﬁcation system remains.
Although the current cluster system does not work
as well as it should, rather than abandon the system
weneed tomake itworkbetter, to ensure fair and con-
sistent funding (Oyebode 2007) and to prevent an
unfair reduction in investment in mental health ser-
vices (Fairbairn 2007; Bhaumik 2011; Jacobs 2014).
What should be done?
• A continued commitment from clinical teams to
cluster mental health patients is required. Since
clustering is built on an outcome measure, the
Health of the Nation Outcome Scales (HoNOS),
providers need to ﬁnd mechanisms to feed back
outcomes to clinical staff in a meaningful way
that will reduce concerns over clustering being
seen as a paper-ﬁlling exercise for managers
(Jacobs 2010).
• Clusters need to be linked to care pathways and
evidence-based care (as recommended in NICE
guidelines), so that they can be linked to measures
of quality and contribute to better patient
outcomes.
• TheMHCT should be reﬁned in order to establish
more homogeneous groupings of patients.
• The classiﬁcation system requires a wider range
of complexity (more clusters), just as HRGs
have increased in number and the clinical labels
have become more speciﬁc.
• Most important of all, there needs to be a signiﬁ-
cant improvement in data quality, for both costs
and activity. A programme to implement the
new payment models needs to be supported to
ensure that all clinicians and services collect reli-
able data about classiﬁcations, care quality and
outcomes. Signiﬁcant investment in information
technology is required and improvement in data
quality needs to be a priority in mental health ser-
vices. TheMHSDS is not yet suitable for use as an
information tool to accurately count activity,
which would be central to its use as a platform
for the payment system. To develop it for this
use, all commissioners and providers should rou-
tinely use only the MHSDS in their contracting
and monitoring processes. This will facilitate a
single consistent use of data across all commis-
sioners with any given provider and prevent pro-
viders wasting resources ﬁlling in different
dataset requirements for different commissioners.
It will also incentivise rapid improvement in the
data quality of the MHSDS because it can be
used by all commissioners and providers to
benchmark activity.
So, although clustering patients may seem a tedious
or pointless requirement for clinical teams, it is
crucial for the overall ﬁnancial sustainability of the
mental health sector. NHS England has already
recognised the need to strengthen the clinical rele-
vance of clusters in relation to clinical care pathways
(NHS Improvement 2016).
Conclusions
There is continuingdebate abouthowbest to organise
a funding model for mental healthcare, as with other
healthcare. Mental healthcare lagged behind physical
healthcare in not implementing an episodic payment
system. It is now caught between systems (block
grants – an emerging but underdeveloped episodic
system – and an ill-deﬁned, aspirational capitation
system). The risk in all this of confusion is that com-
missioners and providers will fail to develop a
robust payment system that links fair payments to
high-quality care and good outcomes for patients.
A payment system is needed that could be used to
support service improvements and better patient out-
comes. Whatever system is adopted, some form of
classiﬁcation of patients related to their conditions
and needs will be imperative. If we scrap the current
system of care clusters we will have to go back to
square one and it is not very clear how else we
would move on from there, nor how long that would
take. The care clusters are ﬂawed in the ways that
we have demonstrated above, but knowing their
ﬂaws and having a reasonable empirical basis to
understand their use provides us with an opportunity
to improve the clinical and ﬁnancial bases of the clus-
ters and to move forward with putting mental health-
care onto a ﬁrmer and fairer approach to its funding.
Data quality is a signiﬁcant challenge with any
payment system, but data collection is at least
underway using clustering, and collected routinely.
Jacobs et al
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Our key recommendations related to cluster are as
follows.
• clinical teams must continue to collect clustering
data and they should be given meaningful
routine feedback of HoNOS ratings, which under-
pin the MHCT, so that the collected data can be
effectively utilised
• clusters need to be linked to care pathways and
the evidence-based care in NICE guidelines so
that they can be linked to measures of quality
and contribute to better outcomes for patients
• the MHCT should be reﬁned to establish more
homogeneous groupings of patients
• the classiﬁcation system requires a wider range of
complexity (more clusters)
• and there needs to be a signiﬁcant improvement
in data quality, for both costs and activity: this
requires providers to invest in information tech-
nology and commissioners to commit to using
only the MHSDS in their contracting processes.
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MCQs
Select the single best option for each question stem
1 Both capitation and episodic payment
approaches potentially create incentives
for:
a under-provision of services
b over-provision of services
c duplication of services
d providing more expensive services
e longer length of stay.
2 Block contracts are characterised by:
a a fixed-sum payment
b a payment that does not take account of the
number of patients treated
c relatively easy contracting arrangements
d a lack of transparency
e all of the above.
3 A capitated payment system:
a may discourage preventive care
b provides good data to track patient care activity
c requires a risk-adjusted price per person to be
defined
d is linked to the number of patients treated
e disincentivises integrated care.
4 Clusters:
a are a diagnostic classification
b are a good discriminator of cost variation
c are used to underpin block contracts
d show large variation in activity between
providers
e can be used as an outcome.
5 Clustering is needed:
a to categorise patients with similar levels of need
b to define levels of activity
c to understand local patterns of care and variation
d to underpin a more transparent funding system
e all of the above.
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